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ABSTRACT. Rule of law is a concept that is regularly debated by legal philoso-
phers, often in connection to discussion of the concept of law. In this article, the
focus is not on the substance of the conceptual claims, but on the methodologies
employed by legal philosophers, investigating seminal articles on the rule of law by
Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron. I argue that their philosophical argumentations
often crucially depend on empirical or legal doctrinal arguments. However, these
arguments remain underdeveloped. I explore how these arguments could be
linked to approaches related to rule of law in different fields of legal scholarship
and investigate how the methodologies of these fields may complement each
other. Thus, the article aims to provide an argument for a specific form of tri-
angulation of three kinds of approaches to the rule of law: philosophical, social-
scientific and legal doctrinal. This method of triangulation is illustrated by a dis-
cussion of the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rule of law is one of legal philosophy’s favourites. It is a concept
that is closely linked to the general questions of the concept of law,
to the debate on descriptive versus normative accounts of law, and
to other central concepts of legal philosophy, such as rules and
authority. However, the rule of law is not simply a hobbyhorse for
legal philosophers; it plays a central role in the practice of law as a
normative idea, which legal systems around the world should up-
hold. What the rule of law consists of is therefore also of significant
practical importance. The starting point for my argument here is that
the importance of the rule of law idea also has methodological
consequences: It requires attention to the way the rule of law
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functions and is perceived. Thus, this article raises the following
questions: How do empirical and legal arguments figure in legal
philosophers’ accounts of the rule of law, and how can the use of
these arguments be improved?
My basic argument in this article is that the turn to empirical and
legal arguments by legal philosophers makes it useful to engage
empirical social science and doctrinal legal scholarship in order to
support those arguments. Rather than simply positing an empirical
claim about people or society or a claim about the character of legal
institutions or procedures, and making the conceptual normative
argument dependent on these, legal philosophers could benefit from
considering the results of social-scientific work and legal scholarship
on the rule of law. More tentatively, I advance a characterization of
the distinctive approach of each field of rule-of-law scholarship and
investigate how these methodological stances enable the comple-
mentarity of the three perspectives. In addition to providing addi-
tional support for necessary empirical or legal claims in the
conceptual argument, these other disciplinary approaches also chal-
lenge legal philosophers to ask different questions. These questions
need to be taken more seriously than they are now.
As a starting point, I present the theories of Joseph Raz and
Jeremy Waldron as two good examples of conceptual arguments
about the character and principles of the rule of law. In this article, I
am not concerned with the debates as such among legal philosophers
about the character of the rule of law and its central values, or about
the relationship between the rule of law and theories about the
concept of law. Raz and Waldron both defend their own plausible
conceptions of the rule of law, which I accept as viable theories of
the rule of law. I focus on their arguments for the content of the rule
of law: Waldron’s claim that the rule of law is not primarily formal
or substantive but procedural, and Raz’s exposition of the eight
principles that make up the rule of law. I will show at which points
and in what manner they turn to empirical or legal claims (Sec-
tion II). I then proceed by examining how those particular claims
could be further supported by work in other disciplines. Waldron’s
claim leads to a discussion of socio-legal work on legal consciousness
in Section III and, together with Raz’s claims, to a discussion of legal
scholarship on the institutions of the rule of law in Section IV. In
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both discussions, the positive supportive claims are contrasted with
critical comments that could be made of the conceptual philosoph-
ical work. In Section V, I present my own proposal of triangulation
of disciplines and discuss how the distinctive methodological ap-
proaches can complement each other. In Section VI, I apply the
triangulation of legal philosophy, socio-legal studies and doctrinal
scholarship to the example of the Rule of Law Index.
One cautionary note regarding legal philosophy needs to be made
beforehand. In this article, I do not distinguish the project of ana-
lytical and descriptive legal philosophy from normative and evalua-
tive legal philosophy.1 Although analytical philosophy in the
tradition of H.L.A. Hart is more clearly concerned with conceptual
argument, a very similar orientation on concepts is characteristic of
the more normative philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin, John
Finnis or Jeremy Waldron. Most importantly, in the context of this
article, they are in conversation with each other about the rule of
law, mostly relying on conceptual argument about normative con-
cepts related to the rule of law and supporting conceptual claims
with normative argument. Although in other debates, such as the
debate on the nature of law, the distinction between analytical and
normative positions is a crucial one to make, in this debate on the
rule of law it is possible to treat them as part of the same set of legal
philosophies.
II. CONCEPTUAL THEORIES ON THE RULE OF LAW: RAZ
AND WALDRON
Most legal philosophers would agree with the statement by Joseph
Raz that the rule of law is a political ideal. It is political in the sense
that it governs political decision-making and the design of rules, and
it is an ideal because it is a valuable idea in need of realization. Legal
philosophers see it as their task to clarify the normative concept of
the rule of law, and often also to provide a justification of the rule of
law’s importance. There is a quibble about the right order in which
to do this: should we first explain what normative components the
rule of law has and which principles satisfy it or should we first
1 The debate on the methodology of legal theory is well described by Julie Dickson, Evaluation and
Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart 2001); Julie Dickson, ‘Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey, Legal
Theory 10 (2004), 117–156; and Michael Giudice, Understanding the Nature of Law: A Case for Constructive
Conceptual Explanation, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2015).
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consider what the rule of law is for? This is the debate about the
‘laundry lists’ of the rule of law versus the teleological approach
proposed by Martin Krygier.2 Of course, it matters what other values
the rule of law is argued to promote because this is bound to
influence the conception of the rule of law or the principles that
support it. However, none of the theories of the rule of law can
avoid giving substance to their conception – what does content of
the rule of law amount to? – and arguing why that conception is the
right one.
Here I will discuss two of those conceptions of the rule of law and
the arguments for them: the conceptions offered by Joseph Raz and
by Jeremy Waldron.3 A classic in the rule-of-law literature, ‘The Rule
of Law and its Virtue’ by Raz is most often read in the context of the
debate between Hart and Fuller on the rule-of-law principles as an
internal morality of law.4 However, a significant part of the text is
devoted to an exposition of the principles that Raz sees as the core of
the rule of law as a valuable political ideal.5 Raz presents his eight
principles of the rule of law as following from the basic intuition that
‘the law must be capable of guiding its subjects’.6 The first two
principles, that ‘[a]ll laws should be prospective, open, and clear’ and
‘[l]aws should be relatively stable’, Raz derives from his basic intu-
ition of guidance.7 A retroactive law cannot guide people, because
there is nothing to be guided by at the moment of action. The same
can be argued for obscure or ambiguous laws or constantly changing
ones. It is striking, of course, that Raz (usually pitted against Fuller in
jurisprudential debates) has a very similar argument to that of Fuller
in The Morality of Law: failure to observe these principles makes the
law incapable of governing conduct, and conformity to these prin-
ciples is a matter of degree. Raz adds a third principle: that the
2 Martin Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology’. In G. Palombella G and N.
Walker (eds.) Re-locating the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart 2009), pp. 45–70; Martin Krygier, ‘Four Puzzles
about the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? And Who Cares?’ In: J. Fleming (ed.) Getting to the Rule of
Law (New York: New York University Press 2011), pp. 64–104.
3 The discussion will be focused on their seminal articles on the rule of law, rather than on their
work more broadly.
4 Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), pp. 210–229; see Kristen Rundle, ‘Form and agency in Raz’s legal positivism’,
Law and Philosophy 32 (2013), 767–791.
5 Mark J. Bennett, ‘Hart and Raz on the non-instrumental moral value of the rule of law: A
reconsideration’, Law and Philosophy 30 (2011), 603–635 at p. 626.
6 Joseph Raz, Authority of Law, p. 213.
7 Raz, Authority of Law, p. 214.
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making of particular legal orders needs to be guided by general rules
conforming to the first two principles. All of this is a conceptual
argument based on the guidance function of law. However, the rest
of the principles Raz enumerates no longer directly follow from the
basic intuition. Principles four to seven all concern the place and
functioning of the judiciary in a legal system: its independence, the
importance of principles of natural justice, the power to review rule-
of-law conformity and access to the courts. The eighth principle is
rather specific, on limitation of the powers of crime-preventing
agencies, which I will not discuss further. I am interested in the list of
court-related principles. Where do these come from? Can law only
guide its subjects if there are independent courts, which are easily
accessible? How do these principles follow from the conceptual claim
about the character of law? Raz does give an argument for the
independence of the judiciary linking it to guidance, but with a twist:
(4) The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. It is of the essence of municipal legal
systems that they institute judicial bodies charged, among other things, with the duty of
applying the law to cases brought before them and whose judgments and conclusions as to the
legal merits of those cases are final. Since just about any matter arising under any law can be
subject to a conclusive court judgment, it is obvious that it is futile to base one’s action on the
law if when the matter comes to adjudication the courts will not apply the law and will act for
some other reasons.8
At first sight a guidance argument is made here: ‘just about any’ legal
question can be subject to a court judgment, so you need to know
what these judgments are in order to know what the law asks of you.
This argument, however, needs a few extra steps. Unlike Hart, who
gives an extensive argument for the need for rules of adjudication in
legal systems, Raz only posits that it is essential to have courts. A
further argument is needed to show why general rules combined
with particular orders are not enough. This could be done on the
basis of Hart’s work.9
More crucially, the independence of the judiciary does not really
follow from this reasoning. It is the duty of judges to apply the law in
order to provide guidance, because people need to know what the
law is, and things become complicated if judges do not apply the
legal rules. But what does this have to do with independent decisions
by judges? Why might it not be an administrative official, subordi-
nate to the government, who applies the rules? The guidance
8 Raz, Authority of Law, pp. 216–217.
9 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 91–99.
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function of law does not generate a conceptual argument that re-
quires independence. It seems much more likely that Raz uses the
character of existing legal systems that he knows about to come up
with this principle. Supporting arguments for principles five to seven
are even less informative. For example, Raz states that the principles
of natural justice include ‘open and fair hearing, absence of bias, and
the like’ and to be ‘obviously essential for the correct application of
the law’.10 Are these principles essential to get at the facts of court
cases or for interpretation of the laws? What else is essential other
than a fair hearing and impartiality? It also matters whose guidance is
meant: Is it the citizen who is involved in the case? That would be
strange, because court cases are backward-looking: They consider
whether the law has been applied correctly. If it is guidance for the
broader citizenry, it seems that the principles of natural justice are
not so important. To them, the outcome of the case matters. Prin-
ciples of natural justice are important for citizens as a guarantee of
the fairness of procedures they may be involved in, but that is not a
matter of guidance.
There are fine arguments for these principles of judicial inde-
pendence, impartiality, etc., but they are not conceptual; they refer
to actual legal systems and the experiences within these systems. The
four principles concerning the judiciary make sense, once we place
them in the context of legal doctrinal arguments about the structure
and functioning of legal systems. Before I go into the nature of those
arguments in Section IV, I turn to Waldron’s procedural rule of law.
In ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, and a number of related
articles,11 Jeremy Waldron takes issue with the standard division of
rule-of-law theories into the categories of formal and substantive
theories.12 Formal theories require only form-related characteristics
of legal rules such as clarity and prospectivity, while substantive
theories also require certain content, such as non-discrimination or
protection of individual rights. Waldron disagrees with this catego-
10 Raz, Authority of Law, p. 217.
11 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, Georgia Law Review 43 (2008), 1–61; Jeremy
Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’, In J. Fleming (ed.) Getting to the Rule of
Law (New York/London: New York University Press 2011), pp. 3–31; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of
Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’, Law and Philosophy 21 (2002), 137–164.
12 Paul P. Craig, ‘Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical framework’.
Public Law (1997), 467–487; Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law. History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 91–113.
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rization because he believes a crucial strand of rule-of-law theorizing
does not receive adequate recognition in either the formal or the
substantive view. He argues that the prime value of the rule of law is
procedural: It is the access to courts and the procedures within them.
To some extent, the procedural rule of law is complementary to the
formal aspects; the eight principles of Raz are partly formal and
partly procedural. However, Waldron argues, there are situations in
which demands of procedural rule of law are in tension with formal
requirements.13 Procedural rule of law demands that citizens have a
voice in court procedures, but this entails that their arguments are
listened to and may be used to interpret legal rules in novel ways,
which makes law less predictable, therefore detracting from a central
formal requirement.
What I am interested in here are Waldron’s arguments for
highlighting procedure in the rule of law. His starting point is a
comparison between a philosophical and a popular idea of the rule of
law. He acknowledges that in legal philosophy the rule of law is
primarily thought of as formal (e.g., by Raz and Fuller), but he claims
that in popular opinion the rule of law is seen as procedural:
When people say, for example, that the Rule of Law is threatened on the streets of Islamabad or
in the cages at Guantanamo, it is the procedural elements they have in mind, much more than
the traditional virtues of clarity, prospectivity, determinacy, and knowing where you stand.
They are worried about the independence of the Pakistani courts and about the due process
rights of detainees in the war on terror.14
Waldron thus claims that in the eyes of ordinary people rather than
theorists, the formal elements of the rule of law are subordinate to
procedural elements, which include the independence of courts and
procedural rights.
His reasoning for the importance of procedure is further sup-
ported by a conceptual argument that, like the rule of law, the
concept of law too is more court-centred than most theorists
acknowledge. Of the five essential requirements for counting as a
legal system, this is the first he discusses: ‘First and foremost, I do not
think we should regard something as a legal system absent the
existence and operation of the sort of institutions we call courts’.15
Waldron offers this as a suggestion, and does not provide further
arguments other than, again, what people ordinarily think. ‘Most
13 Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’, p. 19.
14 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, p. 9.
15 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, p. 20.
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people, I think, would regard hearings and impartial proceedings –
and the accompanying safeguards – as an essential rather than a
contingent feature of the institutional arrangements we call legal
systems’.16 Waldron has much to say about the further moral rea-
sons to value the procedural element in law and the rule of law, but
here I want to draw attention to his strategy of countering the
conceptual accounts of legal philosophers by appealing to ‘how the
term is ordinarily used’ and what ordinary people ‘have in mind’.17
To summarize the point of this section, it is useful to give a brief
characterization of how I understand conceptual argument as prac-
ticed by legal philosophers. Conceptual argument is the explanation
or justification of the meaning of central concepts of law, such as
rule of law, in terms of other concepts in a theoretical argumenta-
tion. Such argumentation often builds on basic intuitions, such as
Raz’s notion of the guidance function of law. It may also use the
common-sense meaning of a concept as a building block in a con-
ceptual account, but on its own this is not sufficient.18 A good
conceptual argument gives a coherent explanation or justification of
the central concepts and thus goes beyond direct appeal to the
ordinary understanding of a term.
Because Waldron so explicitly contrasts philosophers’ arguments
with what ordinary people think, I interpret Waldron’s appeals to
what people say and think as empirical claims: how people in fact, in
political and popular debate, understand the rule of law. However, it
is questionable whether we can rely on common sense and our own
understandings of popular debate as an adequate source of such
understanding. In the next two sections, I will argue that a turn to
empirical social science and to doctrinal legal scholarship is helpful to
support, and in some respects criticize or question, the non-con-
ceptual arguments made in legal-theoretical accounts of the rule of
law.
16 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, p. 22.
17 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’, p. 22 and p. 9 respectively.
18 See Alex Langlinais and Brian Leiter, ‘The Methodology of Legal Philosophy’, in: H. Cappelen,
T.S. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2016), DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.9, who give a useful exposition of
Hart’s linguistic or conceptual analysis, also discussing how it differs from ordinary language philoso-
phy.
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III. MAKING USE OF EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
The starting point here is where I left the discussion of Waldron: the
claim that people have in mind independence and due process when
they think of the value of the rule of law. This is an empirical claim
about the actual ideas ordinary people have about the rule of law, for
which Waldron only advances support by way of media reports.
Does the fact that people criticized the regime for Guantanamo Bay
detainees in terms of the rule of law provide sufficient evidence that
people believe that the procedural elements of the rule of law are
more important than the formal ones?
There are at least two reasons why this question should be an-
swered in the negative. The first reason is that such a line of rea-
soning depends on the incidents that cause public outcry: These are
extreme cases that are hotly debated, while the smaller problems of
the rule of law and everyday experience with it are not discussed.
The second reason is that it depends on a particular legal culture:
Waldron’s examples are American or common-law examples, and
American legal culture is one of the most judicially oriented around
the world. For instance, if one were to ask about rule-of-law prob-
lems in Bulgaria or Romania, chances are that general governmental
corruption is seen as the most pressing rule-of-law problem.19 If the
idea is that a general concept of the rule of law needs to take account
of popular views of the rule of law, it seems rather limited to look
only at the Anglo-American setting.
To overcome these limitations and gather more robust evidence
on what ordinary people think of the rule of law, it is helpful to
consider empirical social scientific work. More particularly, because
the argument depends on what people think of the rule of law, the
scholarship on legal consciousness is a promising source for support
of the claim that people regard procedural rule-of-law principles as
the most important. Rather than opinion polling the general popu-
lation’s views on rule of law, legal consciousness research focuses on
the everyday significance of law and the way this shapes and is
shaped by what people believe and do.20 In The Common Place of Law,
19 Sabina Pavlovska-Hilaiel, ‘The EU’s Losing Battle Against Corruption in Bulgaria’, Hague Journal
on the Rule of Law 7 (2015), 199–217; Bojan Bugaric, ‘The Rule of Law Derailed: Lessons from Post-
Communist Countries, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 7 (2015), 175–197.
20 Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law. Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1998), pp. 34–35.
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Ewick and Silbey developed a typology of attitudes towards the law
based on interviews. Distinguishing between positions ‘before the
law’, ‘with the law’ and ‘against the law’, they show how people’s
attitudes towards law differ depending largely on the situations in
which they find themselves.21 Their research thus shows that dif-
ferent cultural attitudes to law are available: People may believe in
law’s autonomy and formal rules as a system that does not really
concern their everyday life (‘before the law’), they may see law as a
game they can play in their own interest (‘with the law’) or they may
see law as an oppressive force to be resisted (‘against the law’). This
research does not really support a general claim about the rule of
law. Only the attributes of being ‘before the law’ have a relation to a
rather formal idea of rule of law. Procedural fairness does not play a
large role here, because people with this attitude do not see law as an
opportunity for their own engagement. Neither the manipulation by
the group ‘with the law’ nor the scepticism of being ‘against the law’
points to much faith in the link between law and procedural values.
Of course, this does not necessarily entail that the rule-of-law value
has become irrelevant or has taken on a completely different
meaning. It might be that a negative attitude about the existing legal
system is fuelled by disappointment about the realization of rule-of-
law values. If people come to legal institutions with the expectation
of delivery of justice, and are disappointed, this could very well mean
that the ideal of rule of law as procedural is what they see being
thwarted. This strand of legal consciousness research thus gives in-
sight in the problematic relation between awareness of law and the
perception of law as oriented towards the rule of law. However, it is
not very informative on possible values associated with the rule of
law in popular consciousness.
A more open approach, based on an idea of living law, is more
promising in this respect but also directly shows the variation of rule
of law cultures. Using Ehrlich’s idea of living law, Hertogh re-
searches what he calls ‘the social definition of the rule of law’.22 In
the context of rule-of-law promotion, Hertogh criticizes the mea-
suring of compliance with the rule of law as defined in Western legal
thought. He advocates using a working model of the rule of law,
21 Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law, p. 51.
22 Marc Hertogh, ‘Your rule of law is not mine: rethinking empirical approaches to EU rule of law
promotion’, Asia Europe Journal 14 (2016), 43–59. (DOI 10.1007/s10308-015-0434-x)
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broadly sketched as ‘the most desirable relation between law and the
state’23 (or law and official authority more broadly), to look for rule-
of-law values without predetermining their meaning theoretically. In
the case study he discusses, a study of life in a Burmese refugee
camp, these values turn out to be harmony and order rather than
rule-based reasoning or procedural argument. Hertogh’s research
reinforces points made earlier by socio-legal scholars such as Selz-
nick, Krygier and Cotterrell that the rule of law only gains specific
meaning in a particular context and legal culture and that there is
huge variation in the understandings of the rule of law.24
It may well be that the court-centred procedural ideal of the rule
of law is indeed particular to the Anglo-American tradition. For
instance, in the American research of Tyler, procedural fairness turns
out to be a central value that people use to evaluate their encounters
with the law.25 Tyler contrasts procedural fairness with the out-
comes: People care about the way they are treated and the oppor-
tunities they have to voice their point of view rather than just paying
attention to the result of the procedure. Although this supports
Waldron’s point, the research is limited from a rule-of-law point of
view because the contrast between procedures and outcomes was
the focus in the research set-up, and other rule of law aspects, such as
the clarity of rules or non-discrimination, were not included in the
research.26 Moreover, contrasting this work with that of Hertogh, it
may well be that in a legal culture that is court-centred, values
associated with courts become prominent in people’s ideas about
rule of law. There is no good way of disentangling the long-term
existence of particular institutions from the consciousness of related
rule-of-law values.
Therefore, a crucial insight from this discussion of socio-legal
studies is that rule-of-law scholars should place their own accounts in
a historical and cultural tradition. Then, even the commonalities
between the common law rule of law and the civil law Rechtsstaat
23 Hertogh, ‘Your rule of law is not mine’, p. 53.
24 Philip Selznick, ‘Legal Cultures and the Rule of Law’, In M. Krygier and A. Czarnota (eds.) The
Rule of Law after Communism (Dartmouth: Ashgate 1999), pp. 21–38; Martin Krygier, ‘Four Puzzles about
the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? And Who Cares?’, p. 98–99; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Law in Culture’,
Ratio Juris 17 (2004), 1–14 on law and culture more generally.
25 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’, Crime and Justice 30
(2003), 283–356.
26 The research is focused on encounters with the police and courts, Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice’, p.
285.
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show up as superficial similarities having very different back-
grounds.27 Going back to the English Magna Carta or the French
Revolution shows a difference in emphasis at the very least.28 The
English rule of law emphasizes ordinary law administered by courts,
as in the classic 19th century formulation of the rule of law by
Dicey.29 The German 19th century tradition of the Rechtsstaat was
linked to struggles with the authoritarian state and explains the
emphasis on formal legality, the idea that all state action must have a
basis in legislation. The French idea of l’Etat de droit, emerging after
the revolution, also needed to deal with the power of the legislature,
but the French debate also referred to the Declaration of the Rights
of Man, which might explain why in the French legal tradition both a
strong focus on the legislature and on equal rights can be found. This
is not so much a matter of understanding the historical shape of the
rule of law itself, but of understanding the legal traditions that give
us the resources to think about the rule of law in certain ways, and
not in others. The historical dimension may create awareness of the
links between political developments, ideas about law, and institu-
tional structures, and the way these historical configurations influ-
ence rule-of-law thought. Referring to popular understandings of the
rule of law, but also to empirical research about those understand-
ings is a historically situated argumentative step.
IV. BUILDING ON LEGAL DOCTRINAL SCHOLARSHIP
In Section II, I argued that both Raz and Waldron make use of
claims about legal institutions, in particular courts and court pro-
cedures, with little argument on how the court-related and proce-
dural elements follow from the idea of the rule of law. In this
section, I will examine what legal doctrinal scholarship can add to
the support of that claim. In addition, I argue that legal doctrinal
research also points out new directions for rule-of-law theory, par-
ticularly through its attention for the interplay between different
legal orders. Before going into the specific arguments, however, it is
27 Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 313.
28 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, p. 26 and p. 125.
29 Dicey gives as the first meaning of the rule of law: ‘no man is punishable (…) except for a distinct
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land’, A.V.
Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London: Macmillan 1902, pp. 183–184.
Compare Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law, p. 316.
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necessary to give a brief account of my understanding of legal
doctrinal scholarship, since the concept is used in different ways.
Legal doctrinal scholarship can be broadly defined as the sys-
tematic study of legal norms in the various sources of law that form
the basis of particular legal systems.30 Most legal doctrinal work is
therefore the study of (a part of) a particular legal order, of English,
French, European Union or international law. In the account I give
here, I generalize over common law and civil law traditions.31 Legal
doctrinal scholarship is the study of positive law, but in that study it
takes on board the academic writing about positive law too (and in
that sense is self-referential). In many legal systems, the distinction
between primary sources (legislation, treaties, court cases) and
doctrinal writings is not clear-cut. Doctrine serves as an important
supplementary source, as most explicitly indicated in article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice: ‘The Court (…) shall
apply (…) d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the var-
ious nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law’. The mutual influence and intertwinement of doctrinal writing
and primary sources of positive law shows in the way legal doctrinal
scholarship engages with practical concerns and the current state of
positive law. One way to describe it is as commentary on what
legislatures and courts do.32 Important characteristics of doctrinal
work are its attention to detail, the use of comparative methods and
working towards systematization to achieve coherence of the legal
order. Although doctrinal scholarship closely follows developments
in positive law and legal practice, it adds an interpretive under-
standing, making sense of particular instances in comparison to
others and in relation to a larger whole.
Methodologically, doctrinal scholarship is a combination of
describing, interpreting, and arguing about legal norms and institu-
30 Compare Jan Smits, ‘What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic
Research’, in: R.van Gestel, H.-W. Micklitz & E. L. Rubin (eds.), Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A
Transatlantic Dialogue, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 207–228, at p. 210: ‘[R]esearch
that aims to give a systematic exposition of the principles, rules and concepts governing a particular
legal field or institution and analyses the relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with
a view to solving unclarities and gaps in the existing law’.
31 The argument is general but not universal: I consider the broad traditions of Western legal
systems but do not claim this is a necessary feature of doctrinal scholarship across the globe.
32 W. T. Murphy and Simon Roberts, ‘Introduction’, Modern Law Review 50 (1987), 677–687; Richard
Posner, ‘The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship’, Yale Law Journal 90 (1980), 1113–1130, at p. 1113
argues it is focused on court decisions.
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tions. The interpretive stance of legal scholars, establishing the
meaning of given legal materials in the context of a legal field or
system, is often seen as the key characteristic of legal methodology.33
Description and comparison are often combined with interpretation
and argument regarding norms and values. In doctrinal legal schol-
arship, normativity is part of the subject matter to be described
accurately and systematically, but it is also the core of the arguments
doctrinal scholars make.34 Doctrinal scholarship cannot do without
detailed knowledge of positive law, but that knowledge is not only
used for description but also as a source of normative argument.35
Doctrinal scholarship differs from philosophical work in this
grounding of argument in the context of existing law and in its
internal perspective: It contributes to the development of legal
practice.36
Using these characteristics, I propose to see the particular con-
tribution of legal doctrinal scholarship as the descriptive and nor-
mative study of the interplay between norms of positive law, such as
legal principles, statutory rules and legal cases, and their institutional
context. By this I mean that a particular court decision, a specific
legal regulation or statute, is studied in detail but in the light of the
broader context of the area of law in which it can be classified and of
the legal institutions to which it is related. A recurring type of
question is how a new decision or statutory rule affects the larger
framework of norms and institutions: Does it fit the larger system,
will it change the interpretation of legal concepts or principles and
does it shift the balance between court and legislature? As Singer
argues, lawyers have a special sense of the complexity of law, in
33 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’, in: Mark Van
Hoecke (ed.) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?, (Oxford:
Hart, 2011) pp. 1–18.
34 Jan M. Smits, ‘Law and Interdisciplinarity: On the Inevitable Normativity of Legal Studies’, Critical
Analysis of Law 1/1 (2014), 75–86.
35 Sanne Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy. A Characterization of the Discipline of Law’, in Bart van
Klink and Sanne Taekema (eds.), Law and Method. Interdisciplinary Approaches to Legal Research,
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2011), p. 33–52, at 49.
36 Compare Cotterrell’s idea of jurisprudence: ‘The essential point is that, however wide these
jurisprudential inquiries become, they start from and must relate back to conditions of legal practice and
experience in their particular time and place’. Roger Cotterrell, Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic Thought
and Social Inquiry, (Abingdon: Routledge 2018), p. 56.
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particular of the difficulty of applying principles in concrete actual
cases.37
With this account of doctrinal legal scholarship, we can return to
the issue of the rule of law: How does doctrinal work on the rule of
law relate to the arguments of Raz and Waldron? In the institutional
context of particular legal systems, the importance of courts for the
rule of law and the principles regarding courts that Raz includes, are
easily argued. The independence of courts, procedural safeguards
such as an open and fair hearing, equality of arms in the courtroom,
and access to justice are all elements of legal systems that are
highlighted in doctrinal legal scholarship. Doctrinal scholars not only
discuss these issues positively, showing that they are a central part of
mature legal systems, but they also do so critically, criticizing legal
systems for not providing sufficient safeguards or endangering pro-
cedural rights. Thus, the principles Raz mentions can be supported
by appealing to legal doctrinal arguments.
For example, the independence of courts from other branches of
state power is not only well established as a principle of constitu-
tional law, but also elaborated in doctrinal work. Constitutional legal
scholarship also has much to say about the requirements for inde-
pendence and about the institutional relationship between courts
and legislatures, on which legal and political philosophy are usually
silent.38 As Möllers claims, ‘What constitutional scholarship lacks in
theoretical insight, it compensates by focusing on actual institutional
practices’.39 From a doctrinal point of view, the independence of
courts supports the rule of law because it ensures that the power to
determine the meaning of legal rules is shared by institutions that are
organized as separate bodies. On this view, it is not so much sepa-
ration of powers, but a sharing of powers by separate institutions
that promotes the value of rule of law. The fact that courts, the
judges of which are not directly accountable to other government
37 Joseph William Singer, ‘Normative Methods for Lawyers’, UCLA Law Review 56 (2009), pp. 899–
982, at 938–39.
38 There are exceptions, of course. A combination between legal constitutional scholarship and
political and legal philosophy is provided by Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model
of Separation of Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). From a legal theory perspective, Kyritsis
introduces separation-of-powers doctrine into an interpretivist rule-of-law account, Dimitrios Kyritsis,
‘A New Interpretivist Conception of the Rule of Law’, Problema 10 (2016), 91–109. Palombella frames
the idea of the rule of law as an institutional ideal, Gianluigi Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law as an
Institutional Ideal’, Comparative Sociology 9 (2010), 4–39, https://doi.org/10.1163/
156913210X12535202814315.
39 Möllers, Three Branches, p. 2.
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institutions, need to interpret and apply the rules produced by
lawmakers creates an interplay between legislatures and courts that
curbs the power of each. This argument entails that the indepen-
dence of courts has a slightly different relationship to the overarching
rule-of-law ideal than suggested by Raz, who sees courts as necessary
to provide practical guidance to legal subjects. Court interpretation
may be important for that reason, but it is more important to pre-
vent legislatures from creating arbitrary rules. This may still fit the
Razian argument, but it does so indirectly: It is the complex of
legislative and judicial work that prevents arbitrary rules, which may
then contribute to law’s guidance function.
In this discussion of the principle of court independence, it is
already apparent that doctrinal scholarship not only provides sup-
portive arguments but also reinterprets the idea of the rule of law
from the perspective of the institutional context. This point can be
generalized and extended: Legal doctrinal research also points to the
variation and developments in positive law when it comes to
upholding these principles. A particular strength of doctrinal research
is that it reflects on the changes that take place in the legal systems it
studies. One of the largest changes in positive law over the last
decades has been the intertwinement of international law and na-
tional law, especially in the European context.40 Both the European
Union and the European Convention of Human Rights have been
recognized in legal doctrine as changing the character of the national
legal systems falling within their reach.41 These changes also affect
the rule of law: There are new institutions promoting (their version
of) the rule-of-law ideal, which in turn gives rise to tensions that rule-
of-law research needs to make sense of.
These changes to the rule of law can be found both at the level of
particular principles and at the overarching level of the rule-of-law
ideal itself. A good example of the former in the context of the
Razian rule-of-law principles is the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right to a fair trial. Although the
various European legal systems all encompass notions of fair trial,
40 Although these developments are most advanced in Europe, there are many regional organiza-
tions with similar cooperative goals, such as the African Union or the Association of South East Asian
Nations. In the following I focus on the European context.
41 E.g. Joe Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2403–2483; Helen
Keller and Alec Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights. Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
SANNE TAEKEMA
traditionally there was great variation, for instance between adver-
sarial and inquisitorial systems of criminal justice.42 Under the
influence of the ECtHR’s interpretation of article 6 of the European
Convention, adversarial elements were introduced in systems that
were traditionally inquisitorial.43 This does not mean that the dif-
ferences between the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions have
completely disappeared, but it does mean that there are develop-
ments that make it more difficult to apply the traditional labels.44
Within European legal systems, at least, the meaning of principles of
procedural justice cannot be taken for granted. Rather than simply
stating that they include ‘open and fair hearing, absence of bias, and
the like’,45 research on internationalization and national divergences
of these principles shows the variation in their interpretation and the
difficulties in some legal orders to adjust their procedures to the
international standard, whether it is because of entrenched ideas in
legal culture, practical problems or national politics.
The more fundamental point regarding internationalization and
regionalization of law is the challenge to rule-of-law conceptualiza-
tion: Is it still correct to think of rule of law as an ideal for and within
national legal systems only? Within rule-of-law theory, there is some
discussion of the rule of law at the international level. For instance,
Waldron pays attention to the question whether there is a recog-
nizable rule of international law. In ‘The Rule of International Law’
Waldron asks: ‘(…) what the rule of law demands of lawyers in the
international arena’.46 He discusses the question as parallel to a
municipal rule-of-law question, with the state in the place interna-
tionally of individuals nationally. Although Waldron distinguishes
the state from individuals in terms of their obligations, method-
ologically it is an exercise of comparing and contrasting two models.
With the legal doctrinal discussions on the interrelations between
42 Stewart Field, ‘Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29/2
(2009), 365–387.
43 Although the argument is made that the Court’s interpretation is not clearly adversarial but more
broadly participatory: John D. Jackson, ‘The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes:
Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment’, Modern Law Review 68 (2005), 737–764.
44 Compare Field, ‘Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe’, p. 382.
45 Raz, Authority of Law, p. 217.
46 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’, Harvard Journal of Law and Policy 30 (2006), 15–
30. Joseph Raz recently also made an argument that international law affects the position of state law,
see Joseph Raz, ‘Why the State?’, in N. Roughan and A. Halpin (eds.) In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017), pp. 136–162.
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international law and national law in mind, his question does not go
far enough. It is not a matter of the need to transfer the rule of law
to the international legal realm, so that we have two versions: a
national and an international rule of law. It is a matter of concep-
tualizing how the fact that international norms and institutions co-
determine what the law is at the national level affects the ideal of the
rule of law. One of the questions asked repeatedly in connection to
the United Nations and the European Union is whether such inter-
national organizations have a responsibility for promoting the rule of
law in their member states. Thus, one could ask the question
whether a transnational rule of law needs to include a principle of
oversight of national orders by international institutions.47 For some
doctrinal scholars, that would be a logical next step; for example,
Bingham includes a principle linking national and international law
in his account of the rule of law. His eighth principle reads, ‘The rule
of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in
international law as in national law’, which he primarily applies to
states’ international obligations under international law but he also
points to human rights as an area of law that is protected interna-
tionally, but co-developed at the national level.48 Reflecting on such
doctrinal statements, a conceptual question may be raised whether
the rule-of-law ideal can be reconstructed to cover both national and
international institutions and to address the way they ought to relate
to each other. Thus, the direction of legal doctrinal research gen-
erates a conceptual challenge to reconstruct the meaning of the rule
of law to respond to these legal developments.
V. TRIANGULATION: COMPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES
AND DISCIPLINES
Each of the three disciplines has a distinct perspective with specific
substantive research interests and its own methodological approach.
I have so far been optimistic about the synergies between these three
perspectives, but one could be more sceptical: If the questions asked
47 This discussion is primarily conducted in two arenas, the debate on rule-of-law promotion and on
European Union rule-of-law oversight. See for the former, e.g., Stephen Humphreys, The Theatre of the
Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 2010; for the latter, Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (eds.) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in
the European Union, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016).
48 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane 2010), pp. 110–119.
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and the answers given are articulated in a different language, is it
worthwhile to try to combine them?
My argument so far assumed that the hints at empirical and
doctrinal knowledge from within legal philosophy are a first step
toward collaboration between the disciplines to find support for
these kinds of arguments, but it is possible to argue in the other
direction. Maybe it is advisable to steer clear of empirical and doc-
trinal arguments altogether and limit the legal philosophical argu-
ment to conceptual and/or value-based reasoning only. Various legal
philosophers characterize and justify their own approaches in con-
trast to sociology of law, arguing against the need to engage with
socio-legal work.49 Raz, for example, sees legal philosophy as
engaging with universal and necessary characteristics of law, while
sociology of law describes particulars of various legal systems. As
Raz states, sociology of law ‘provides a wealth of information’ on
contingent features of existing legal systems, while legal philosophy
needs to focus on ‘those few features that all legal systems neces-
sarily possess’.50 However, this division of labour is questionable:
How do we know what the necessary features are without knowl-
edge of the contingent features? As I have argued in Section II,
features that are presented as necessary for the rule of law, such as
independent courts, may turn out to be contingent upon further
examination. As Giudice argues, there is good reason for legal
philosophers to expand their research beyond the necessary and
universal characteristics of law, which he sees as a need to move
from conceptual analysis to ‘constructive conceptual explanation’ in
order to address the observed pluralism of existing conceptions of
law.51
As must be clear from the earlier discussion, I agree with Giudice
that we need to move beyond legal philosophy as a self-contained
project. An important reason for this point of view is that even
clearly conceptual and normative arguments are embedded in tra-
ditions of thought that have been influenced by historical events and
49 Hans Kelsen is perhaps the most famous defender of the separation of the projects of the science
of law and sociology, following from his strict separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. See Ota Weinberger,
‘Introduction: Hans Kelsen as Philosopher’, in Hans Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy
(Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel 1973), p. XI.
50 Raz, Authority of Law, pp. 104–105.
51 Giudice, Understanding the Nature of Law, p. 38. Compare also Langlinais and Leiter, ‘The
Methodology of Legal Philosophy’.
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practices in society and law. Ignoring the interactions between
concepts and values, on the one hand, and social and legal practices,
on the other, impoverishes normative and conceptual work. An
important question, therefore, is how the recognition of the plural-
ism of traditions and conceptions of rule of law, as of law more
generally, affects the project of legal philosophy: How should the
challenge of pluralism be taken up? One way of doing this is by
limiting the amount or scope of universal characteristics. Raz, for
instance, clearly sees municipal legal systems as the central category
to be analysed.52 There is no need for a conceptual analysis that
includes non-state or international law. A second and third possibility
are based on an explicit acknowledgement of the diversity of forms
of law. Giudice’s solution is to look for general contingent features
rather than universal and necessary features, thus admitting that a
conceptual construction may leave some instances of law unex-
plained.53 By contrast, the third possibility is to pluralize the concept
of law itself, claiming that there is a set of plural legal forms. Lon
Fuller’s work on enacted versus interactional law is a good exam-
ple.54 This can be construed as a claim of necessary pluralism: Both
forms of law need to be part of the concept in order to grasp the
notion of law. The latter two approaches are both productive ways
of engaging with pluralism. Since various responses to plurality are
possible, I do not think it provides a knockdown argument against
the possibility of universal characteristics, although these may be so
few that their explanatory power is very limited.
Continuing then with the exploration of the combination of
perspectives, an idea from social science methodology may serve as a
starting point. In social sciences, an often-used methodology is that
of triangulation: using different methods to answer the same ques-
tion in order to corroborate or complement results.55 The assump-
tion is that finding the same results with different methodological
52 Raz, Authority of Law, p. 105.
53 Giudice, Understanding the Nature of Law, p. 67 ff.
54 Lon L. Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, in Kenneth I. Winston (ed.), The Principles of
Social Order. Selected essays of Lon L. Fuller (Durham: Duke University Press, 1981), pp. 211–46.
55 Another often-used term for this is mixed-methods research. There are debates on what the value
of such a methodological approach is and on the purposes of using it (corroboration or complemen-
tarity). Usually, the focus is on the combination of quantitative and qualitative empirical methods. See
Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie (eds.), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral
Research 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage 2010); Norman K. Denzin, ‘Triangulation 2.0’, Journal of Mixed
Methods Research 6 (2) (2012), 80–88.
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tools strengthens the support for those results, and makes the con-
clusions better warranted. Thus, if a researcher interested in the role
of cultural differences in the courtroom finds that his interviews with
judges show that they regard defendants from cultural minorities
differently, and that his courtroom observations point out differences
in the interactions between judges and defendants from minority
groups compared to defendants from the dominant culture, and that
analysis of verdicts shows differences in justification, such triangu-
lation may be said to strengthen the conclusion that judges are
sensitive to cultural differences between defendants.56 In this
example, the methods discussed are all forms of qualitative research,
and they can all be used to answer the same question. Such cor-
roboration is more problematic when the combination is between
methods that are very different in orientation. Triangulating quan-
titative and qualitative research methods is less likely to lead to
comparable results, not least because these methods are suited to
answer different types of questions. Interviews, for example, suit
research into perceptions and reasons people have, while experi-
ments are a proper technique to find correlations and possible cau-
ses. This does not necessarily entail that triangulation with such
diverse methodological tools is not possible; rather it shows that
methodological triangulation does not always serve the purpose of
corroborating results, but may also serve to complement different
insights. If we acknowledge that methods have limited suitability,
i.e., they can only be used to answer particular types of questions,
then it makes sense to combine methods to overcome these limi-
tations. Thus, in the example of cultural differences in the (criminal)
courtroom, we may want to include differences in sentencing out-
comes, an aspect that is best researched by analysing a large data set.
Once the complementary form of triangulation is accepted as a
valid strategy, interdisciplinary triangulation can be seen as a natural
next step.57 Here too, the methods complement each other and may
serve to uncover aspects that the other discipline cannot see or can
only partly understand. Making the argument for complementarity
56 This is a fictitious example. For a quantitative study on such matters, see David L. Faigman et.al.
‘Implicit Bias in the Courtroom’, UCLA Law Review 59 (2012), 1124–1186.
57 An argument why this is nonetheless problematic may use Kuhn’s idea of paradigms to argue that
there are incompatible presuppositions in different disciplines, Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1970); see also Ubaldus De Vries, ‘Kuhn and Legal
Research: A Reflexive Paradigmatic View of Legal Research’, Law and Method 3/1 (2013), 7–25.
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between legal philosophy, empirical socio-legal science and legal
doctrinal scholarship requires a sense of the distinctive contributions
of each and possible connections between them.
Legal philosophy is distinctive in its use of conceptual arguments
about core ideas in law, many of which are normative, such as rules
or rights, or have a normative aspect, such as authority or courts.
The focus on normative ideas also creates a need for normative
arguments to support the substance of these ideas. Characteristic of
the methods of legal philosophy is the construction of theoretical
arguments based on various conceptual elements leading to a
coherent account of basic ideas about law. In practice, the methods
are primarily discursive: examining arguments and counter-argu-
ments, building on existing theoretical work and aiming to improve
on that work by presenting an alternative or modified account.
Abstract theoretical arguments are confronted with concrete ele-
ments in various forms: common sense judgments or everyday
language use, hypothetical or real examples.58 The aims of legal
philosophy may differ:59 They may be descriptive, aiming to make
sense of the meaning and use of legal (normative) concepts, or
normative, aiming to justify the use of certain normative principles
or values or to argue for the superiority of a particular conception.
For example, Paul Gowder’s book on the rule of law is in large part a
normative argument why the book’s central concept of the rule of
law should be interpreted as requiring equality, but it also makes use
of conceptual arguments about the various elements of the rule of
law ordinarily included in the rule of law.60 His conceptual and
normative arguments are not neatly separated but combined in a
larger philosophical argumentation. This is different in analytical
philosophy, which focuses on conceptual analysis, but I do not take
analytical legal philosophy to stand for legal philosophy in general.61
58 In this respect, the methods of legal philosophy resemble methods of moral philosophy, partic-
ularly that of reflective equilibrium, see Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in
Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).
59 This links to the debate on the methodology of legal philosophy, on the question whether to
approach the normativity of law in a descriptive or normative manner, see Sean Coyle and George
Pavlakos (eds.), Jurisprudence or Legal Science? (Oxford: Hart 2005).
60 Paul Gowder, The Rule of law in the Real World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016),
Chapters 1 and 2. More on his method below.
61 For a careful and mildly critical explanation of the methodology of analytical jurisprudence, see
Michael Giudice, Understanding the Nature of Law. A Case for Constructive Conceptual Explanation (Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar, 2015).
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Moreover, as we have seen in relation to Raz, when it comes to
discussions of the rule of law, philosophers who do analytical work
often engage in normative argument as well. Thus, in philosophical
accounts of the rule of law, the combination of conceptual and
normative argument, as also shown by Gowder, is quite common.
Starting from the assumption that the rule of law is a political ideal,
arguing the value of the rule of law is an important task for legal
philosophy. Although I have not stressed this in the previous dis-
cussions, Waldron uses arguments about the moral value of human
agency and respect for dignity to underpin his account, while also
providing conceptual arguments for his procedural rule of law.62
By contrast, empirical social science focuses on providing factual
evidence to understand what people do and believe. The centrality
of data is characteristic: gathering and analysing facts in various
ways, with an emphasis on finding information. In empirical re-
search, the rule of law as a concept can be measured (do actual
practices conform to it?) or compared to what people believe and do
(as the example of Hertogh’s research showed). Empirical research is
therefore not so much interested in justifying these values as it is in
understanding or explaining why they are upheld or not. The values
of the rule of law are taken as a measurement criterion or trans-
formed into something that is part of people’s actual beliefs and
practices. In this article, I focus primarily on the latter, the research
on cultural understandings of the rule of law, while there is also a
good deal of research on the rule of law from a more quantitative
angle. This would lead to including other disciplines such as eco-
nomics and political science as the empirical perspective.63 The
reason for my focus on this form of socio-legal studies lies in the
arguments that are needed to complement the views of Waldron and
Raz: Their argumentation leads in this direction.
62 Elsewhere, I have argued that his normative arguments on agency are the strongest part of his
rule-of-law theory, see Sanne Taekema, ‘The procedural rule of law: Examining Waldron’s argument
on dignity and agency’, Annual Review of Law and Ethics, Volume 21, edited by B.S. Byrd, J. Hruschka, and
J.C. Joerden (Berlin: Dunckler and Humblot 2013), pp. 133–146.
63 An example is Nadia E. Nedzel, ‘The Relationship between the International Rule of Law,
Spontaneous Order and Economic Development’, ICL Journal 28/2 (2018), 183–211, who uses empirical
economics and legal history as complementary perspectives. More broadly on the rule of law and
economic development, see, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and
Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2006), and Stephan Haggard,
Andrew MacIntyre and Lydia Tiede, ‘The Rule of Law and Economic Development’, Annual Review of
Political Science 11 (2008), 205–234.
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The distinctiveness of legal scholarship is the most difficult to
grasp, but here the focus is on the normative content of the law as an
institutionalized coherent practice. Legal doctrine focuses on the
meaning of legal texts in a particular institutional setting, of a legal
system or particular legal regime, often in comparison to other
systems or regimes, and studies these texts in that context. Because
of its contextual and institutional orientation, it can provide detailed
descriptions that clarify relations between norms, procedures, roles
and arguments. Because of its focus on coherence, it pays specific
attention to the relation between the particulars of the text or case
and the larger whole of the system.64 Legal doctrinal scholarship
does not question the value of the rule of law but is interested in
how it works in specific legal contexts.65
Considering the similarities and differences between the three
disciplines, legal philosophy and doctrinal legal scholarship seem
linked more closely than either of them is to empirical socio-legal
science. The difference between the first two can be characterized as
focus on the general versus the particular: where legal philosophy
tends towards general arguments, doctrinal scholarship focuses on
the way law is applied concretely in particular contexts, and on
comparison of these particular instances. There are also significant
similarities, which can be summarized as a hermeneutic methodol-
ogy: linking descriptive and normative aims and arguments and
using interpretive and argumentative reasoning. Empirical socio-le-
gal science, by contrast, focuses on description and explanation,
staying away from normative claims, and uses a data-based empirical
method.
One way to view complementarity of these three disciplinary
perspectives is to advocate a division of labour in a strict order: First,
legal philosophy provides a careful argument for a particular con-
ception of the rule of law; second, legal doctrinal scholarship shows
how the rule of law conception is given a particular shape and
applied in legal institutions and third, empirical science uses this
conception to find out whether actual rule-of-law practices deserve
to be labelled ‘rule of law’, and whether what goes on in the rule-of-
64 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law. A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2005), pp. 190–193.
65 Comparable to how Dagan and Kreitzer describe ‘law as craft’: Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitzer,
‘The Character of Legal Theory’, Cornell Law Review 96 (2011), 671–691, at 677–680.
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law institutions has meaning in people’s everyday lives. In various
combinations, such work is done.66 However, more interesting
combinations go beyond complementarity and critically reflect upon
the other disciplines. Ideally, the criticized discipline takes on board
the criticism and tries to reorient itself to incorporate it. Thus, the
most demanding form of triangulation of perspectives is to allow for
corrections of one’s own perspective based on the criticism voiced by
the others. This requires a sensitivity to each other’s projects,
acknowledging the value of the other perspective. It entails thinking
about the way in which one’s criticism may be received by the
discipline under scrutiny, being careful to avoid complete dismissal
and posing questions in such a way that it opens up new directions
for the other discipline. This is not to say that fundamental critique is
always unwarranted; there is an argument to be made, for instance,
for criticizing the philosophical idea of the rule of law as biased
towards liberal individualism.67
The idea of triangulating legal philosophy, empirical social science
and legal doctrinal scholarship can be criticized for two types of
reasons: conceptual and methodological. The conceptual objection is
that my classification of the three disciplines is wrong: Why distin-
guish these three? Other theorists advance an interdisciplinary
methodology for legal theorists who draw the lines in different
places. An attempt to do this for rule-of-law research is Paul Gow-
der’s book, The Rule of Law in the Real World, in which he makes a
combination of conceptual/normative legal philosophy with
empirical work. He puts law and philosophy in the same camp, as
the providers of ‘normative/conceptual tools’.68 However, he also
lists law as one of the disciplines providing knowledge of ‘real-world
institutions’,69 which makes it seem as if the discipline of law has a
double function in Gowder’s account: both the source of normative
principles and the provider of knowledge of real institutions. This
points to the difficulty of distinguishing the normative and the
66 Often, there are two steps: the conceptual and the empirical, see e.g. Jørgen Møller and Svend-
Erik Skaaning, The Rule of Law. Definition, Measures, Pattern and Causes (Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014).
67 Makau Mutua, ‘Africa and the Rule of Law’, Sur. International Journal on Human Rights 23 (2016),
pp. 159–173.
68 Gowder, Rule of Law in the Real World, p. 4. For a substantive review, see Peter Rijpkema, ‘Paul
Gowder. The Rule of Law in the Real World – Book Review’, Ethics 127 (2017), pp. 486–491.
69 Gowder, Rule of Law in the Real World, p. 3.
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descriptive in the legal field.70 However, if our interest is in the
justification of conceptions of the rule of law, it is important to keep
track of the kind of argument advanced – conceptual, empirical, or
institutional – because the support needed for such arguments dif-
fers. Another interesting argument, about the concept of law rather
than the rule of law, is given by Michael Giudice, in Understanding the
Nature of Law. Giudice argues for the need to combine conceptual
legal philosophy with empirical social science and moral theory,
leaving out legal doctrinal work. In his framework, it seems that
legal doctrine does no more than provide the problems to which the
combination of the other three disciplines gives answers. As will be
apparent from my earlier account, I think this misses the important
contribution of legal doctrinal scholarship as providing contextual
arguments about the institutional side of the rule of law.71
An objection to my idea of triangulating distinct perspectives
could be that it stops short of what good scholarship should do,
namely to integrate perspectives. Rather than argue that there are
three different perspectives that need to speak to each other, one
could argue that insights from each of these perspectives need to be
synthesized into a disciplinary perspective of its own.72 Dagan and
Kreitzer make this argument in their defence of legal theory as a
middle position between what they see as the dominant other ap-
proaches to law: law as craft, law and policy and sociohistorical
analysis of law. Philosophy of law could well be added as a fourth
corner to which their idea of legal theory relates: ‘One manifestation
of the significance of law and craft for legal theory is legal theory’s
tendency to be less abstract than the philosophical, economic, or
other theories with which it interacts’.73 What is crucial in their
account is that legal theory is a ‘synthesis’ necessary to deal with law
as a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon.74
The triangulation idea advanced here is more modest: Rather
than claim that we need a synthetic discipline of legal theory, I think
70 As argued in the previous section; compare Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy’, pp. 35–36.
71 Compare the criticism of Cotterrell of (analytical) legal philosophy, as insufficiently informed by
juristic concerns, Sociological Jurisprudence, pp. 51–55.
72 Such an argument is made by James Boyd White in relation to law and literature; see his
‘Establishing Relations between Law and Other Forms of Thought and Language’, Erasmus Law Review
1/3 (2009), pp. 3–22.
73 Dagan & Kreitzer, ‘The Character of Legal Theory’, p. 686.
74 Dagan & Kreitzer, ‘The Character of Legal Theory’, p. 687.
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it is ambitious enough to ask of the separate disciplines working on
the rule of law to take seriously the implications of the other disci-
plines for their own work. Thus, legal philosophers need to take on
board the developments in legal doctrinal scholarship and socio-legal
studies that are a reason to question certain preconceived ideas, like
the notion that the state legal system is the central case to account
for.75 This may be reason to investigate how a universalizing ap-
proach of the rule of law can respond to pluralism arguments. How
such triangulation might work is best explained by way of an
example.
VI. THE RULE OF LAW INDEX AS AN EXAMPLE
A striking phenomenon of the last decennia has been the increased
use of indicators to measure the rule of law. There are various
indexes that link to rule-of-law concerns, focusing on issues such as
corruption, freedoms and doing business. Of the indexes that focus
particularly on rule of law, the Rule of Law Index developed by the
World Justice Project (hereafter: the Index) stands out because it is
built on data that are collected specifically for this purpose.76 Data
gathered yearly through questionnaires are scored and combined to
rank countries on their rule-of-law quality. Such an index raises a
number of questions to which the perspectives of legal philosophy,
socio-legal studies and doctrinal scholarship make valuable contri-
butions. The general problem is the adequacy of the Index for
capturing the concept of the rule of law. This question is one for
which triangulation seems to offer a good approach. The concep-
tualization of rule-of-law values and principles is not only key to the
set-up of such an index, but can also be used in a critical mode to
assess the outcomes. In an article explaining the way the Index was
designed, Botero and Ponce explicitly address the issue of turning a
theoretical concept of the rule of law into variables measurable
75 Although I believe these are the main disciplines, there may also be reason to draw on other
disciplines such as political science and history. Although these have their own characteristics, they
share the empirical orientation with socio-legal studies.
76 The most recent report is World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2017–2018, available at
https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/ (last accessed 4 January
2019). For a general analysis, see René Urueña, ‘Indicators and the Law: a case study of the Rule of Law
index’, in: Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.) The Quiet Power of Indicators:
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015), pp.
75–102.
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through questionnaires.77 This raises questions of the precise theo-
retical conception that is put forward, the operationalization of its
components and the context of its application. Although a full dis-
cussion of the Index in terms of a triangulation approach is not
possible within the confines of this article, I can sketch the issues to
which the approach contributes in relation to the theoretical rule-of-
law discussions.
Two ways of linking the Index to the idea of triangulation seem
possible: a narrow and a broad way of combining the three per-
spectives. The narrow application of triangulation uses the Index
itself as the socio-legal component, providing the empirical data. The
question then is what the legal-philosophical and legal doctrinal
perspectives offer as corroborations, challenges or corrections to the
picture provided by the Index and its methodology. At first glance,
the Index is in line with the formal and procedural rule-of-law
conceptions of both Raz and Waldron, as Botero and Ponce sum-
marize its ideas as: ‘ideas, which rotate around the principles that
political power must be exercised in accordance with law rather than
in an arbitrary or self-interested manner, and that disputes among
private individuals and between them and the Sovereign must be
subject to independent adjudication’.78 However, when looking
more closely, it becomes clear that Botero and Ponce have a more
expansive, and substantive, view of the principles necessary to
achieve rule-of-law quality. Of the nine factors they distinguish, the
fourth factor is fundamental rights, and in some of the sub-factors,
other rights-based indicators appear, such as a free press and free
elections. Because this substantive component is not really supported
by arguments other than an appeal to ‘a common theme’ and to the
United Nations’ definition of the rule of law,79 the legal-philosophical
approach may serve as a valuable source of argument to comple-
ment the theoretical framework. Especially Waldron’s normative
arguments for a procedural rule of law as enhancing human dignity
and agency help to join rights to formal procedure. Because court
procedures are crucial to participation of individuals in legal matters,
allowing them to express their own views and confirming their
77 Juan Botero and Alejandro Ponce, ‘Measuring the Rule of Law’, World Justice Project Working
Paper Series nr 1, November 2010, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1966257.
78 Botero and Ponce, ‘Measuring the rule of law’, p. 5.
79 Botero and Ponce, ‘Measuring the rule of law’, p. 5.
SANNE TAEKEMA
status as human agents, they have both formal and substantive va-
lue. However, this does not generate an argument for full-blown
fundamental-rights protection as part of the rule of law, which
would need further reasoning based on dignity and equal participa-
tion. If individuals need equal opportunities to participate in proce-
dures in order to recognize their dignity, they need the freedom and
capacities to do so. Without meaningful access to justice or knowl-
edge about procedural rights, a procedural rule of law will not be
realized. Although this widens the scope of the rule of law beyond
Raz’s elements, Waldron’s theory does restrict the scope of rights to
those with procedural relevance. With regard to a second issue – the
operationalization of the factors – a noticeable feature of the Index is
that it is set up to be outcome-oriented, looking at how the rule of
law is achieved in practice.80 Thus, the questions asked concern
experiences with government procedures and the justice system
rather than the existence of such institutional elements. However,
from a legal-doctrinal perspective this outcome-orientation seems
somewhat overstated. Although some questions are about the out-
comes of legal procedures, many of the questions concern the
experience with the institutions themselves: e.g., awareness of pro-
cedures, possibilities to participate and experiences of impartial
treatment or corruption. From a doctrinal perspective, these are
questions about the functioning of the institutions and procedures
that involve the process rather than simply the outcomes. Although
the focus shifts from a focus on outcomes to a more even attention
to institutions and the way they function, doctrinal scholarship thus
actually supports the content of the Index. In such a narrow appli-
cation of triangulation, I tentatively conclude that it is possible to
achieve a more coherent and better-supported account of the Index
project than the one provided by the makers of the Index by
themselves: restricting its meaning to a substantively coloured pro-
cedural rule of law and acknowledging the importance of legal
institutions in this.
While a narrow form of triangulation is mainly useful to fill gaps
in the argumentation for the Index, a broader form of triangulation is
potentially more critical. To construct it, I return to the points made
80 Botero and Ponce, ‘Measuring the rule of law’, p. 16: ‘The second fact is that, for the most part,
our focus is on rule of law outcomes; as opposed to the institutional means, or inputs—including the
legal and regulatory frameworks—to attain them’.
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about pluralism earlier, which may be elaborated to apply to the
Index. Such a broader form of triangulation does not take the
framework of the Index for granted, but also questions underlying
aims and assumptions of such an assessment of the rule of law in the
world. The most important methodological change from a narrow
form of triangulation is to make use of other socio-legal research
than the empirical data of the Index, most importantly including
theoretical implications of legal sociology and anthropology. And by
asking what rule-of-law aspects are not included, doctrinal scholar-
ship may be used for criticism by applying its insights on interna-
tionalization of rule of law. Finally, the discussion in legal philosophy
about the normative core of the rule of law can be used to challenge
the choice of the factors of the Index and the aggregation of the
scores.
This combined use of the three perspectives may be labelled a
multi-faceted legal pluralism challenge: pluralism of legal orders,
pluralism of legal cultures and contexts and pluralism of rule-of-law
values. I do not mean to suggest that a pluralism challenge is an
inevitable direction for broad triangulation – Gowder, for instance,
criticizes the Index for being multidimensional rather than one-di-
mensional81 – but it is a challenge that is fuelled by important in-
sights from all three perspectives.
The pluralism of legal orders — in the sense of the interactions
between international and national law — and its importance for the
rule of law is a point made repeatedly by doctrinal scholars, as shown
above in Section IV.82 In the Index, there is no reference to the
international dimension of the rule of law (other than the use of the
UN definition). A question worth asking is whether a country con-
forms to international norms, particularly, when it comes to rights
protection, in the form of human rights treaties. From a doctrinal
perspective, the internationalization of the rule of law cannot be
ignored when fundamental rights are concerned: There is clear
influence of international developments in national legal practices
and national courts contribute to the development of these rights
81 Gowder, Rule of Law in the Real World, pp. 176–181.
82 E.g. André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2012); Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, pp. 116–119.
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transnationally.83 Socio-legal studies bring forward the importance of
the pluralism of legal cultures, which also has implications for the
reach of the rule of law and the ways to protect it.84 The way in
which the Index touches upon legal-cultural pluralism is interesting.
It embraces pluralism in the ninth factor, informal justice, where it is
acknowledged that the rule of law may be enhanced by effective
dispute settlement by non-state actors, in traditional, religious or
community-based forms. Although the Index thus incorporates the
insight that access to justice may be provided in ways other than
through formal courts, in the final aggregate score of the Index this
factor is not counted, because the Index compilers say the mecha-
nisms are too varied and measuring their effectiveness is too com-
plex.85 This choice is significant: Not only do the limitations of the
Index become clear – its methodology cannot cope with an aspect
that is seen as necessary theoretically – it also points to a pluralism of
underlying values, which also appears in a legal-philosophical per-
spective. If we admit that a full picture of rule-of-law realization
needs to include non-state orders, the Index approach needs to be
combined with other types of research, particularly the ethno-
graphic, contextual method of legal anthropology. Thus, the socio-
legal pluralism point also challenges the quantitative approach of the
Index. From a different angle, the legal philosophical perspective
may also do this: by developing the point of rule of law value
pluralism.
A crucial debate in legal philosophy about the rule of law con-
cerns the relationship between the ideal of the rule of law and other
values and purposes. Both Raz and Waldron distinguish rule of law
from these, but acknowledge the need to justify the rule of law in
terms of further purposes, such as serving freedom through guidance
(Raz) or protecting human dignity through procedural standing
(Waldron). Both Raz and Waldron acknowledge that the rule of law
may be justified by reference to different values. As discussed in
Section II, Waldron even argues that the different strands of the rule-
of-law ideal are in tension with each other: Whereas the formal rule-
83 André Nollkaemper, ‘The Internationalized Rule of Law’, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1
(2009), 74–78.
84 Compare Martin Krygier, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’, in Roughan and Halpin (eds), In
Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence, pp. 293–325.
85 Botero and Ponce, ‘Measuring the rule of law’, p. 15–16.
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of-law aspects demand predictability to provide stability, the proce-
dural aspects lead to openness by recognizing the arguments of
individual agents, in order to acknowledge their agency. If this
argument of internal value pluralism is accepted, the Index needs to
be questioned on a more fundamental level. What are the values that
the rule-of-law conception of the Index furthers? What is the
underlying justification? This question is not explicitly addressed, but
looking at the various factors, one sees links between social order
and freedom, open government and participation, access to justice
and non-discrimination.86 Thus, the range of different values served
by rule of law according to Botero and Ponce is even broader, and
the set of values seen as integral to rule of law more varied, than
those advanced by Raz or Waldron. This plurality leads to problems
when it comes to measuring the rule of law. As Raz argues, value
pluralism implies incommensurability,87 which means that aggre-
gating the scores of different factors, protecting different values, into
one number is not possible. Aggregation leads to intriguing results;
for example, Singapore scores 0.80 while Canada scores 0.81, but the
factors on which they score well are very different.88 Canada also
scores well on the Freedom House index of ‘Freedom in the world’
(99/100) while Singapore does not make the list of free countries,
only scoring 52/100.89 If the rule of law is supposed to serve indi-
vidual freedom, this discrepancy is problematic. The values of social
order and individual freedom may not be as clearly linked as the
Index suggests. I would conclude that reporting on the Rule of Law
Index is more useful without aggregating scores, that it needs to be
contextualized and read in combination with other sources.
Of course, this sketch of a critique of the Index on the basis of
three perspectives is only a start, and it is clear that it could be done
differently.90 What I hope to have shown is that the combination of
three perspectives strengthens the basis for criticism and that the
three perspectives can be used to reinforce and supplement each
other’s arguments, when looking at a specific rule of law issue.
Moreover, although I have been critical of the projects of Raz and
86 Botero and Ponce, ‘Measuring the rule of law’, p. 10, 12 and 14 respectively.
87 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon 1986), pp. 321 ff.
88 WJP Rule of Law Index report 2017–2018, pp. 6–7.
89 See the most recent Freedom House report at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
freedom-world-2018 (last accessed 4 January 2019).
90 As Gowder’s criticism of the Index shows.
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Waldron as separate legal philosophy, it turns out that their views
make crucial contributions to the assessment of a concrete phe-
nomenon such as the Index.
VII. CONCLUSION: ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
Thus, the bottom line of interdisciplinary cooperation may not be
seeing other disciplines as the source of information that can be put
to use in one’s own perspective, but of the other discipline providing
a different framing of the issues that challenges your own discipline
to change its questions. Central in this regard are the methodological
limitations of each discipline: Knowing what can and cannot fruit-
fully be asked should be central to the conversation. Having such a
dialogue, however, does entail being open to interpreting the views
from the other discipline charitably, and making a genuine effort to
consider in what way these can be incorporated in one’s own
framework. That means making sure the claims from the other
discipline are well understood, but also that they can be turned into
viable arguments in one’s own context.91
For legal philosophers, this implies that they stand to benefit from
interdisciplinary cooperation if they go beyond using common-sense
knowledge of the social context of law and beyond their own partial
knowledge of legal doctrines and institutions. Legal philosophy
needs to be open to these forms of interdisciplinarity if it aims to be
serious about all of its arguments, including the empirical and doc-
trinal parts of these. Moreover, legal philosophy will be more rele-
vant for the study of law more broadly if it is willing to take a more
interdisciplinary course.92 In combination with other perspectives,
the philosophical study of the rule of law makes important contri-
butions to our understanding of this central legal value.
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